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Contractarian Methods in Political
and Legal Evaluation
Kim Lane Scheppele and Jeremy Waldron
The discussion of John Rawls's work over the last twenty years has
made contractarianism a familiar term in political theory.' But although
Rawls's work was rooted in the familiar social contract theories of
Locke, Rousseau and Kant and although other theorists have made some
use of the approach, the general discussion of the concept of con-
tractarian argument in the modem literature has remained focused on
Rawls's particular conception of it.' Criticisms of Rawls's theory have
been assumed to be criticisms of contractarianism in general, and the
limitations in Rawls's use of the "social contract" idea have been
assumed to be limitations that any contractarian would encounter. In
part, this is because Rawls himself has contributed so much in his more
recent writings to the critical discussion of the methods used in A Theory
of Justice.3 We think it is time, however, for the discussion of con-
tractarianism to be detached from the analysis of that particular work, so
that it can be considered on its merits as a general approach to political
and legal evaluation.
Our aim in this article is to present contractarianism in an attractive
light. But we do not assume that there is just one contractarian method.
There are many, and a consideration of contractarianism as a general
theoretical approach involves a consideration of the differences among
these various methods and the choices that must be made in their design.
In this article, we consider some of those choices-between negative and
positive contractarianism; hypothetical, tacit and actual consent; holistic
and particular evaluations; rational choice and Rousseauian assumptions
about the motivation of the contracting parties, and so on. These choices
1. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). See also D. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY
AGREEMENT (1986); D. RICHARDS, A THEORY OF REASONS FOR ACTION (1971); Scanlon,
Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103 (B. Williams & A. Sen
eds. 1982); M. LESSNOFF, SOCIAL CONTRACT (1986).
2. For the distinction between concept and conception, see J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 5-11 and
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 103, 134-136 (1978).
3. See Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515 (1980) [hereinafter
Kantian Constructivism]; Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 223 (1985) [hereinafter Political not Metaphysical].
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raise issues with which any particular contractarian conception must
deal.
Before moving to an analysis of the various elements of the con-
tractarian approach, it is important to get a grip on the general idea of
contractarian evaluation and on what the various conceptions share in
common. Historically, the idea of the social contract took political obli-
gation and the legitimacy of government to be rooted in, and limited by,
the consent of the governed rather than by tradition, iure divino, defacto
power, utilitarian expediency or other sources of authority. The advo-
cates of the extreme versions of this approach took government to be an
actual construction of the people with no greater authority than the peo-
ple had chosen previously, or than they chose presently, to confer on it.
In more realistic and moderate versions, however, the consent of the gov-
erned was viewed not as an historical hypothesis but, in Kant's words, as
"an idea of reason" in terms of which political judgments might be
expressed.4 The evaluation of a law or a constitution might be facilitated
by considering whether, given certain assumptions, the people who were
to be bound would have chosen to obligate themselves in this particular
way, even if the evaluator knew that the people who were to be bound
had had no actual opportunity of undertaking such deliberations. In the
modern literature, the more modest approach has prevailed.5 The advo-
cates of this approach maintain that the actual origins of government are
uninteresting from the point of view of normative theory. Contractarian-
ism as a basis for present evaluation stands apart from such concerns and
has more to do with the abstractions of various sorts of decision para-
digms in the understanding of politics than with any speculations about
its historical provenance.
In general terms, the modern contractarian idea may be expressed as
follows. To resolve a normative disagreement on some political or legal
issue, it may be helpful to ask what the people involved in the dispute
would have agreed to do about the issue had they considered the possibil-
ity of disagreement before reaching the point at which the actual disa-
greement took place. This "thought experiment" has the feature of
asking people to stand back from their current deadlocked positions in
order to consider what arrangements might have been designed to pre-
vent such deadlocks from arising. It asks us to take, as our touchstone of
political and legal evaluation, a conception of what people would agree to
in advance as a framework for constraining the way they organize their
lives and resolve their disputes. The thought is that institutions and
arrangements, actual or proposed, that can be presented in this light have
a greater claim to legitimacy and a greater claim on our support than
4. See I. KANT, KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 79 (W. Reiss ed. 1970).
5. J. RAwLs, supra note 1, at 12-13.
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those presented simply as "better" or "more useful" without the media-
tion of any idea of consent.
That is how we understand the concept of a contractarian approach.
It is very general and abstract, and it leaves a number of questions
unanswered.
First, what sorts of disagreements are to be approached in this spirit-
disagreements about the general framework of constitutional law and
broad social structure, or disagreements about particular legal rules and
social policies? Rawls believed, for example, that contractarian argu-
ment could not settle even the particular question of the desirability of
private property in the means of production, but could only address the
more general issue of what the terms of that debate ought to be.6 Was he
right about this? Or can contractarianism provide insights into very spe-
cific social, political and legal problems?
Second, if we are asking what people would have agreed to before they
became involved in some actual disagreement, we also have to ask how
long before the disagreement, in how much abstraction from its particu-
lar terms, and under what conditions are we to imagine them deliberat-
ing? Some disagreements in politics involve a clash of self-interests;
others involve a clash of altruisms or of competing moral ideals. Often
these motivations are intermingled. Are we to imagine an agreement
among egoists or altruists or moralists or what? Should such people con-
sider what they would have agreed to on the basis of their own particular
interests and ideals? Or does the thought experiment require them to
stand back from their beliefs and pose the more abstract question of what
people with potentially conflicting interests and ideals (whatever these
turned out to be) would have agreed to do in the abstract about such
conflicts when they arose? It is essential to the contractarian idea that we
imagine ourselves standing back some distance from the actual fights in
which we are presently involved or else we simply duplicate the dead-
locked dispute. But are the interests and ideals we bring to the dispute
part of the conflict from which we are to distance ourselves or part of the
persona who are to undertake the distancing experiment?
Third, when we imagine people deliberating in advance of actual con-
flict, what sort of conclusions are we to imagine them coming up with?
Should we imagine them agreeing on what must be done or merely on
what may be done? How much room is our thought about their
imagined deliberations to leave us for our actual deliberations? When we
involve ourselves in political conflict in real life, we do not always or
necessarily resolve the matter through force. We make and listen to
arguments, debate issues, strike bargains, count votes, and so on. Indeed,
the procedures which contractarians imagine are only an idealized form
6. Id. at 265-273.
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of political procedures that sometimes actually take place. So what is the
relation between actual and imagined deliberation? Does the latter pre-
empt the former? Does it leave issues unresolved which are to be settled
only in the heat of actual political debate? Or is there some more subtle,
internal relation between the two, so that contractarian argument is
thought of as a resource to be used in political argument rather than as
something which constrains or sets boundaries for the realm of politics?
This last set of questions is particularly interesting inasmuch as it
raises the issue of the relation between contractarianism and democracy.
In some ways, democracy itself is a contractarian idea-seemingly the
clearest expression of government by and with the consent of the gov-
erned. But democracy and contractarianism have their tensions, too: the
contingencies of democratic politics leave issues of principle at the mercy
of the play of political forces; and in its majoritarianism, democracy
seems at odds with the contractarian idea that the consent of each person
is needed before she can be said to have assumed an obligation or before
power can legitimately be exercised over her. At a further remove, these
are also questions about the overall utility of the contractarian approach.
In our general formulation, we said neutrally that "to resolve a nor-
mative disagreement . . . it may be helpful to ask what the people
involved.., might have agreed to do" if they had been considering the
matter in advance. It may be helpful, but it may not be conclusive. It
may just exercise an influence on our political arguments rather than
determining their outcome. Still, it is worth considering. The idea of
using self-assumed obligation as an evaluative paradigm in politics and in
law has been so resilient in our tradition that it is unlikely that an ade-
quately formulated contractarian argument can simply be dismissed out
of hand. So we have to ask how contractarianism stands in relation to
other models of political argument and what forms of discourse a con-
tractarian should regard as an appropriate complement to her own.
These are the questions we shall explore. Maybe they have no right
answers (although we believe that there are better and worse ones for
many of them). These questions, taken together with the formulation
that gave rise to them, identify the concept of a contractarian argument.
Each particular set of answers that one gives, along with the reasons for
those answers, define a particular conception of that concept-the con-
tractarian method that a particular theorist is using.
The remainder of our paper is divided into three parts. Part I
addresses contractarianism in general. It asks what reasons there might
be for approaching political disagreements in the spirit we have just out-
lined. Part II considers what one might call the "internal mechanics" of
a contractarian argument: the range of issues that are considered, the
conception of the deliberators, the nature of their deliberations, and the
sort of conclusions they are conceived to come up with. Part III
[Vol. 3: 195
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addresses the application of contractarian arguments, and the implica-
tions for this approach of modem debates about the relativism or univer-
salism of theories of political and legal morality.
I. WHY CONTRACTARIANISM?
Why should anyone be tempted to think in contractarian terms about
politics or about law? Temptation arises from two main sources. The
first is a cluster of ideas about individual freedom and its relation to the
ordering of social life-ideas that take consent as the pivotal term which
reconciles individual freedom with social action. The second main
source of temptation is a cluster of ideas concerning equality and impar-
tiality-ideas that require us to think in a way that puts our own claims
on the same basis as those of other people. Both clusters of ideas need to
be examined in detail.
The tradition in which contractarian ideas developed was one that put
enormous emphasis on individual freedom without ruling out the various
benefits which might arise from the actions of individuals with or upon
each other in ordinary social life. Thus, for example, liberals have always
stressed principles of self-ownership and the integrity of the person
against outside interference, but they have taken consent or permission as
the main way in which an individual acting freely can allow others to
benefit her by encroaching on her person in various ways (from sex to
sport to surgery). The link with contractarianism lies in the view that
since governments characteristically encroach on the persons of those
subject to them (for instance, through the use of coercion and punish-
ment), government action can be reconciled with freedom only if these
encroachments can be represented as plausible subjects of consent. The
same tradition also emphasizes the idea of self-assumed obligation as a
way of reconciling individual liberty with the constraint that social life
invariably involves. If the rules of our society can be represented without
too much distortion as things we have promised to obey, then the con-
straint associated with our obligation to obey them becomes a product of
our own free action rather than an oppressive imposition from the
outside.
The second cluster of ideas tempting us to think in contractarian terms
concerns equality and impartiality. Morality, in the broadest sense,
involves taking seriously the claims and interests of others and giving
them the same weight in moral argument as one gives claims and inter-
ests of one's own. Impartiality requires a person to distance herself from
the heat of her particular involvement in a disagreement and to try to
evaluate the impasse from the points of view of all the others involved
with or affected by it. There is an optimism in liberal thought, expressed
1991]
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most strikingly by Rousseau,7 that people who do this can be expected to
agree, to converge on a single view of what should be done about the
issue. Such commentators do not think of political morality as a set of
principles whose validity is independent of what people believe; rather
the principles of political morality just are the conclusions on which
people would converge if they were to think impartially about the initial
disagreements in which they were involved. In this way, contractarian-
ism captures both the reciprocity of contract-the quid pro quo-and
also the underlying identity of interests that all the contracting parties
share in common.
Clearly, these ideas call for some more detailed exploration, since in
spite of their connection to the contractarian approach, they do not all
pull in the same direction. Let us begin with the ways in which consent
can enrich an account of personal freedom.
Our paradigm of self-assumed obligation is the promise-an undertak-
ing given by one person to another with the specific intention of creating
not only an expectation in the other person, but also a norm or standard
by which the subsequent conduct of the promise-giver may be judged.
There are several competing analyses of the nature of promissory obliga-
tion, but all of them give prominence to the connection between the vol-
untariness of the undertaking and the moral force of the obligation that
flows from it.' Though promises bind-and though their bindingness is
felt when they operate as a constraint or limitation-still, promising, spe-
cifically with that implication, is a free act.9 As a result, it provides an
attractive model for those who wish to justify social constraint while
maintaining a commitment to freedom. If the obligations of social and
political life-the rules and principles we are to live by and to which we
are to submit our disputes even when it is irksome to do so-can be
represented somehow as the subject matter of promises we have given,
then our being bound by them will seem less of a derogation from our
freedom than it might otherwise appear.
Now it is important to stress that in politics, the bindingness of an
obligation has two aspects: on the one hand, there is the question of
whether the person is morally obligated by virtue of having promised,
and on the other, the issue of whether the promise may rightfully be
enforced at law should the person fail to meet its terms. Few of us think
that all obligations should be enforced by the power of the state; but
political theory, obviously enough, is particularly concerned with dis-
cerning the kinds of obligations subject to enforcement, and in general
with the use of force, threats, violence, and manipulation by agents of the
7. J.J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk. II (G.D.H. Cole trans. 1973).
8. See, e.g., Raz, Promising and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF H.L.A. HART (1982).
9. Roughly, the more binding the promise is to be, the more free the act must have been.
[Vol. 3: 195
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state to get people to fulfill their obligations. This second aspect of bind-
ingness raises what we can call the issue of political legitimacy; if consent
is relevant here, it is relevant not as a means of generating obligations but
as a way of getting around what would otherwise be strong and binding
prohibitions on the use of violence and coercion against persons. Just as
consent to a surgical procedure turns a grievous wound into a legitimate
operation, so consent, in advance, to the state providing welfare services
turns the demand for taxes into a legitimate request rather than theft by
the state.
The two uses of consent-as a source of obligation and as a source of
legitimacy-have much in common. Both are highly individualized
ideas. One cannot be constrained by another's promise, nor can an
assault on one person be legitimated by the consent of another except
under very special conditions. This is important from a political point of
view, for it provides a sharp contrast between contractarian and
majoritarian approaches to justification. Since consent affects only the
freedom of those who have given it, one cannot be voted into a social
contract by a majority--even an overwhelming majority---of others.
There are, however, important differences between the ideas of legiti-
macy and obligation and important ways in which they may come
apart. 10 Hobbes illustrated one such way in his claim that persons facing
imminent death have no obligation to submit to it, even in cases where its
imposition on them is legitimate. A group of traitors being led justly to
execution has no moral obligation whatever to refrain from conspiring to
escape."' Similarly, the state may act legitimately to restrain or disable a
dangerous maniac, even though the maniac's sanity was so far lacking
that no serious question of her obligation to obey the law could arise
(because she is incapable of conforming her actions to a norm).
From a contractarian point of view, the most important difference
between legitimacy and obligation is this: a person cannot be actually
obligated by a hypothetical promise she might have entered into. The
idea of promising requires the free assumption of an obligation that has
no other basis except in the actual consent of the person assuming it. So
consideration of what people would have agreed to, in circumstances
where clearly they have not agreed to that or anything else, tells us noth-
ing about their promissory obligations. With the consent that confers
legitimacy, however, the situation is slightly different. Consent here is
related rather more closely to an objective sense of interests than it is in
the obligation case. If an unconscious person needs urgent surgical
attention, the surgeon's actions may be legitimated by an affirmative
answer to the question of whether the patient would have agreed to the
10. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-224 (1986); Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of
Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127 (1987).
11. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 270 (C.B. Macpherson ed. 1981).
1991]
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operation if she had been conscious, and this hypothetical consent can be
assumed more readily when something is clearly in the hypothetical con-
senter's interest. Hypothetical consent, in other words, can sometimes
legitimate even though it can never actually obligate. This is important,
for it suggests that modem contractarianism-with its emphasis on
hypothetical models-is an unhelpful tool for telling us much about what
our obligations actually are (unless, like Rawls, we think there is an
independent obligation to support institutions that a contractarian model
shows to be just). At the end of the next section, however, we shall argue
that hypothetical models may still be useful for telling us what our polit-
ical obligations are not.
Classical contract theorists were anxious not to call into question
either the existence of a general obligation to obey the law or the general
legitimacy of government, and they were therefore fairly relaxed about
what counted as actual consent; submission at the point of a sword was
sufficient for Hobbes 2 and the mere use of a country's highways counted
as tacit consent for Locke. 3 It is easy to ridicule these claims, but for the
classical theorists, the point of the consent idea was to stress not the
contingency of each person's potential obligation, but the idea that sub-
mission to the state must be seen as a rational individual act, intelligible
in the case of each person in terms of some benefit she expected to
receive. "A Rational Creature cannot be supposed when free, to put
himself into subjection to another, for his own harm," wrote Locke.14
For these writers, the attraction of the contract model was not only the
way it reconciled freedom and government, but also the way it presented
government as an arrangement whose legitimacy was tied intimately to
its being to the benefit of each and every individual bound by it.
Of course, both Locke and Hobbes had gone far beyond the early con-
tractarian idea of government as a contract between prince and people.
Both embraced the more sophisticated version in which the contract was
among the people themselves to set up a government, and the obligations
were owed primarily to one another. Political society, in other words,
was seen as an arrangement of reciprocity and mutual benefit. People
were willing to submit themselves to governmental power in return for
the benefits that might accrue from the equal submission of others. And
people agreed to constrain their conduct to make cooperation possible on
condition that others would obligate themselves by similar constraints.
These ideas of equality and reciprocity can be developed in a more
abstract direction in relation to the second cluster of ideas we men-
tioned-ideas about moral consensus, impartiality and universalizability.
Morality, in the broadest sense, involves taking seriously the claims and
12. Id. at 251 et seq. (Ch. 20).
13. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 392 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1965) (3d ed. 1698).
14. Id. at 423.
[Vol. 3: 195
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interests of others and giving them the same weight in moral argument as
one gives claims and interests of one's own. Impartiality requires one to
distance oneself from the heat of one's particular involvement in a disa-
greement and to try and think about it from the points of view of all the
others involved with or affected by it. Universalizability calls on us to
consider a disagreement not only from our own point of view but also
from the points of view of others who are involved in it. Though in the
heat of a particular conflict we may oppose their interests or ideals, we
should nevertheless consider what it is like to hold those interests and
ideals, and what one's own interests and ideals must look like from the
opposite point of view. Sometimes the nature of the dispute makes that
easy; sometimes it is a difficult task. Suppose the dispute concerns the
law of fraud and nondisclosure in real estate contracts: I know some-
thing about my house which, if I were to disclose it to a prospective
purchaser, might persuade her to abandon the deal or offer a lower price.
Though her interests and mine conflict in this case, it is easy for me to
put myself in her shoes since I too will be a purchaser on another occa-
sion and will have interests, on that occasion, more or less exactly similar
to hers. The interests that divide us in this conflict are interests associ-
ated with roles that are readily and commonly reversed."5 In other con-
flicts, identification with an opposing party may be much more difficult.
It requires considerable imagination for a person born to wealth to iden-
tify with the predicament of those poverty-stricken people who are con-
strained by the wealthy individual's property rights. And when
disagreement and conflict involve racial and gender issues, where we
have next to no experience of role reversal, and where, for example, a
white male's identification with a black or a woman involves imagining
not just a different body but a whole different history in which attitudes
are forged, pain felt, and fears crystallized, impartiality becomes sud-
denly a very demanding, though not impossible, ideal.
Even if one succeeds in putting oneself in another's shoes, the process
of impartial moral thinking cannot stop there. So far, it merely reveals
the complexity of moral disagreement, leaving open the question of what
should be done next once the successful identification with the interests
and ideals of one's antagonists has occurred.
There are two well-known answers to this question. The first is R.M.
Hare's and it leads directly to utilitarianism:
When I have been the round of all the affected parties, and come
back, in my own person, to make an impartial moral judgment giv-
ing equal weight to the interests of all parties, what can I possibly do
except advocate that course which will, taken all in all, least frus-
15. For a discussion of nondisclosure and fraud in cases like this one, see K. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL
SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 109-178 (1988). For a different
example of the general problem, see also Matthew 18:23.
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trates the desires which I have imagined myself having? But this (it
is plausible to go on) is to maximize satisfactions. 6
If maximizing satisfactions is an appropriate thing for a person to do in
regard to her own interests and preferences, it is, on this account, also an
appropriate thing for an impartial person to do across the whole array of
other's interests and preferences with which she has managed to identify.
The difficulties with this route into utilitarianism are well known. It
assumes that identifying with each in turn is the same as identifying with
all at once. And in its analogy between prudential and impartial max-
imization, it pays insufficient attention to the fact that some interest may
have the force it does for its holder because it gives her life the only
meaning it has. To maintain that inter-personal maximization across
interests of this sort has anything in common with intra-personal pru-
dence is obviously a serious distortion.'7 It ignores the distributional
aspects of the problem and may result in particular individuals finding
themselves so seriously disadvantaged that it becomes impossible to tell
any consent story for them which would have that outcome as a plausible
ending.
The other approach is the one that leads from impartiality to con-
tractarianism. Instead of imagining myself in everyone's position, I imag-
ine instead that I know I am going to be in somebody's position but I do
not know whose, and I try to think of what resolution I would opt for if I
were considering the matter from that perspective. The critical point
here is that being a person means living a particular life, not a life on
average or a life of aggregated experiences. And if I am trying to decide
how a conflict should be resolved or a policy formulated or a society
structured, I will want, on this view, to worry about how each individual
is treated when the actual decision is put into effect. After all, I may turn
out to be the individual who ends up in the worst (or any) position, and I
will want to ensure that the result for that person will be bearable and
seem fair to her then in light of what could have been done. If I don't
know which person I will be in advance of the particular outcome, I shall
certainly want to focus on the position of the person I would least want
to be, to make that the best I can manage to arrange in the event that
things turn out for the worst. 8 And, in general, I will want to ensure
that each of the positions defines a life that is bearable.
Now if everyone has this view of how to make decisions about political
arrangements in advance, then all will have the same incentives to worry
about the potential for disaster hidden in the allocation of social positions
or in the fallout of particular political arrangements. Everyone should
16. R.M. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 123 (1963).
17. For a similar argument, see S. SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM Ch. 3
(1982).
18. This is, of course, the maximin strategy discussed by J. RAWLS supra note 1, at 150-161.
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then also agree on which decision would be best to take, since each indi-
vidual will focus on the same criterion for what constitutes a desirable
outcome and will have reason to make as bearable as possible the circum-
stances of every person affected by the scheme. This gets us a long way
toward the consensus that contractarianism requires. Each individual
will be removed from the particular constellation of interests and ideals
that accompanies her actual current social position, and she will be
required to think seriously about the consequences of a decision for each
particular hypothetical individual who may very well turn out to be her-
self. If everyone thinks like that, consensus is much easier to achieve
than it is in circumstances where everyone approaches the decision prob-
lem bringing only her own present interests and ideals to the situation.
Such a thought experiment produces much the same results as direct
rights-based arguments, but it does so through a mediating device that
allows a person to imagine from the force of possible personal experience
what it would be like to live without such guarantees.
The idea that contractarianism might be developed in this way out of
underlying hunches about freedom and equality is of course not new. In
Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin argued that Rawls's con-
tractarianism was a device for expressing the force of deep rights-based
principles.19 And in his own more recent work, Rawls has conceded that
the contract model is, so to speak, an intermediate construction in moral
theory, intermediate, that is, between deep values and political
judgments:
The original position is a third and mediating model-conception: its
role is to establish the connection between the model conception of a
moral person and the principles of justice that characterize the rela-
tions of citizens in the model-conception of a well-ordered society.
It serves this role by modelling the way in which the citizens in a
well-ordered society, viewed as moral persons, would ideally select
first principles of justice for their society. The constraints imposed
on the parties in the original position, and the manner in which the
parties are described, are to represent the freedom and equality of
moral persons as understood in such a society.2°
Does this imply, then, that the contract idea can be dispensed with
entirely, and the argument pushed (if it has any validity at all) to the final
answers directly from the deep values? This is an unhelpful suggestion
for two reasons. First, the contract model may be the best or most fluent
way we have of expressing the relation between the deep values of free-
dom, equality, impartiality, and common interest that are said on this
account to underpin it. It may give us the most direct route we have
19. R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 150-183.
20. Kantian Constructivism, supra note 3, at 520.
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from those premises to our conclusions. Second, even if the contract
model is strictly redundant, it preserves an imagery of politics which is
both normatively attractive and historically significant.
In addition, the contractarian thought experiment is designed not just
to represent formally how to get from deep moral premises to particular
conclusions, but also to provide us with reasons to be convinced along
the way. Developing a structure in which one's own interests and exper-
iences can be used to fill in the informational gaps in a rigorous reasoning
process is one way to accomplish this persuasion. The prospect of actual
experience-imagining that it is oneself who will wind up with the short
straw--carries with it the immediacy of interest and the force of authen-
ticity. The belief that others are like us, that they will feel no better than
we would about being deprived of important elements of a full social and
political life, harnesses our self-interest and transforms it into empathy.
We are persuaded of our conclusions not just by the force of logic, but
also by the twin forces of interest and experience generalized to feel and
understand the lot of others.
Above all, the proposal to "do without" the contract model if it is
truly intermediate underestimates the complexity of direction in moral
argument. People do not start with their value premises ready-made and
reason linearly from them to their conclusions; nor do they start with
their conclusions and find a way to support them from below. We come
into moral argument in medias res, reasoning downwards from ideas we
find attractive to premises we construct to underpin them from which we
can in turn move upwards to other conclusions that might initially have
seemed surprising. To jettison the contract device because it is neither,
strictly speaking, the starting point nor the end point of a linear argu-
ment would deprive us of both resource and resonance in the enterprise
of discovering what our starting points are and what our end points
should be.
II. CHOICES FOR CONTRACTARIANS
Once we opt for the contractarian approach, how are we to proceed?
We are to approach political disputes in the spirit of ascertaining how the
parties would have agreed to resolve them if they had given thought to
the possibility of the disputes arising before they actually became
involved. Obviously, this process involves a degree of abstraction from
the pressures of the moment. But just how that abstraction is to be
accomplished is something that must be decided in any contractarian
analysis. What disputes, what parties, and what sorts of deliberations are
we to imagine?
A. Holistic and Piecemeal Contractarianism
The first important issue concerns the sorts of disputes for which the
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contractarian approach is thought to be appropriate. Rawls insisted the
approach was to be used for the evaluation of nothing less than the basic
structure of a society, taken as a whole:
For us, the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society
or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions dis-
tribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of
advantages from social cooperation . . . . Taken together as one
scheme, the major institutions define men's rights and duties and
influence their life prospects, what they can expect to be, and how
well they can hope to do. The basic structure is the primary subject
of justice because its effects are so profound and present from the
start.
21
This we shall refer to as the holistic approach. An alternative is to use
contractarian methods to evaluate particular laws or social arrange-
ments, taking the rest of the system (though only for the time being) as
given. We shall refer to this as the piecemeal approach.
On the face of it, either approach seems possible. Contractarianism is
an approach for making evaluative judgments, and whether we take a
piecemeal or a holistic approach should depend, surely, on the sort of
judgment that we would want to make. A designer of constitutions-a
Bentham, say, or a Rawls-will be interested in the holistic approach, for
the disputes they want to resolve are disputes about the standards for
judging the basic structure of society. An ordinary legislator, on the
other hand, will have a less ambitious agenda. She knows that she can-
not alter all the laws, but can only make a little bit of progress here and
there. She will be interested, then, in using a contractarian approach to
determine a fair resolution to a particular legislative problem she faces,
whether the subject be abortion law reform, a modification of criminal
procedure or whatever. A judge may be even more constrained;
although she is inevitably engaged in lawmaking, her primary responsi-
bility is to do justice to the parties before her. The contractarian question
she asks herself (if she does) may be, "what rules would people have
agreed to, to deal with disputes of this sort?" or "what would these peo-
ple have chosen to deal with disputes of this sort?", but certainly not
"what basic structure would people have agreed to for the society in
which they were to live?" The latter question not only may not give
specific enough answers for problems of the sort that judges address, but,
in addition, such questions may also be entirely inappropriate for judges
to ask within the limits of their role. It seems, then, that one can adopt a
more or less piecemeal contractarianism depending on the nature and
scale of one's concerns and the constraints and responsibilities of one's
office.
21. J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 7.
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However, there are still considerations that will pull us in different
directions here. The advantage of the holistic approach is that the rules
and structures of society often operate as a system so far as people's well-
being is concerned. My well-being-the goods and opportunities that I
have, my life chances, and so on-are the net effect of the impact of all
social rules upon me from time to time. We see this from the way in
which the impact of one rule may be mitigated by another: imprisonment
for a criminal offense, for example, is a somewhat greater harm for an
individual (and so calls for a more substantial justification) if the state
does not provide welfare assistance for the prisoner's needy dependents
than if it does. This suggests that the laws should at least be considered
as a system, even though a particular agent has the authority to tamper
only with a small part of it. A law reformer may be prepared to consider
only one small aspect of the law, but if she has to choose between reform
X and reform Y, she should perhaps choose that reform which, when
taken together with the aspects of the system she cannot change, will
yield an overall system which is better or more just.
22
Against that view, however, the realistic law reformer (whether judge
or legislator) may worry that she cannot always rely on the current sys-
tem. For example, a judge concerned about poverty facing an incoming
administration devoted to abolishing critical elements of the welfare state
may want to build redundant "safety nets" into individual legal rules to
guard against catastrophe for the litigants who come before her in the
event that the protections currently in place are removed. A legislator
worried about a possible erosion of protection for criminal defendants
through judicial decisions may want to write redundant protections into
specific pieces of legislation. Generally, the realistic assessment that the
whole system of laws and policies in force in a divided government lies
beyond the control of any particular political actor may lead the dedi-
cated contractarian to make important decisions taking each rule, each
policy, each decision on its own without considering the set of backdrop
institutions and rules that would otherwise come into play in the individ-
ual case. Of course some backdrop considerations have to come into play
in each decision, but assessing which ones and how much impact they
should have is something that a contractarian legislator or judge may
want to consider anew with each decision.
In addition, there is the consideration that, in many cases, people do
not swallow their social system whole, so to speak. People are often con-
cerned that justice be done in a particular case or that a particular rule
should be just when considered on its own, irrespective of the impact of
other rules or institutions. If rule X considered in itself is more just than
22. It is interesting that Rawls suggested that the contractarian case for utilitarian principles
might be stronger if the social system were considered piecemeal. Id. at 170-171.
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rule Y, people with this sort of concern may prefer X even though the
whole system would be more just with Y than with X. This might be the
case where X offered redundant protections and there were some loss of
efficiency from having both X and Y as live options when there was no
difference in the level of protection offered. But the fact that, for exam-
ple, people can fall back on the welfare system if their tort claims aren't
recognized, can hardly comfort those who believe that tort judgments do
more than compensate people for injuries but in some sense also vindi-
cate the injured party.23 Similarly, if people believe that it is worth their
while to press tort claims for the precedents they may establish that
would reduce the incidence of further accidents for others, then simply
compensating a person for her injuries would not accomplish this either.
Some of the redundancy built into piecemeal contractarianism may be
due to the fact that the various solutions to particular problems are not
completely fungible. If they were, then the piecemeal contractarian, like
her holistic counterpart, would find no difficulty with adopting in a par-
ticular case a solution already in place for another problem.
Sometimes the press toward piecemeal evaluation happens because
certain rules-for example, those that impose stigma-can be cata-
strophic for individuals in a way that no other benefit can mitigate.24
Mainly, though, it is because of the way in which we individuate laws in
our moral thinking. We may be concerned that each particular rule seem
fair and that it have a justification of its own, over and above the claim
that it fits into a system whose justice is considered as a whole. In the
comparison of piecemeal and holistic contractarianisms, both sides are
committed to doing justice to each individual, but holists are prepared to
put up with particular rules that seem unjust in themselves if that is nec-
essary for a system that treats each individual most justly in terms of her
overall prospects.25
Perhaps the most convincing case for piecemeal over holistic con-
tractarianism starts from the observation that, in real life, political
reform always involves a stage of transition. Holistic theories do not take
23. For example, we may think that a defendant required to pay damages for negligence suffers
not only the financial loss (for which welfare support may partially compensate) but also the "moral
harm" of being presented as someone who has failed to live up to her obligations to take care in
social life. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 3.
24. But, if so, a holistic approach would recognize this fact also.
25. But how far should we take this? It may be that the tendency of piecemeal contractarianism
is to move toward a purely equitable system where each case is taken on its own merits without
concern for rules at all. But why would anyone consent to live in a regime where each case was
decided individually, without the sort of predictability that rules provide? It would be difficult for
someone living in a society like this to avoid running afoul of the law because one would not know
whether particular actions might be illegal. And if one could tell what was forbidden (by reference
to bad consequences or violation of particular principles), then one would have some rules for
determining this, and one would not have a purely case by case system. This does not rule out some
reference to equity in cases where the rules do not fit comfortably. But it does say that those cases
should be exceptions to well-understood rules and should only be decided on the basis of principles
that are themselves part of the larger framework to which people have agreed.
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this sufficiently into account. Rawls's theory, for example, provides no
way to get "from here to there" without dislocation of a sort that might
be condemned by the very principles he espouses.26 A piecemeal con-
tractarianism, where the system of institutions and rules is left in place as
each component of this system is in turn revised, promises a much less
disruptive transition phase than a wholesale recasting of political and
social institutions. Moreover, since each individual reform must pass
contractarian muster, the problem of intermediate violations of consent-
based morality does not arise. Piecemeal contractarianism may provide a
better way of achieving real contractarian reform than the holistic ver-
sion. And if piecemeal reform is pursued patiently and thoroughly, there
is no reason why it should not be as comprehensive and as radical as a
holistic approach.
B. The Contracting Parties
The second question to ask in order to proceed with the elaboration of
a contractarian approach is "who are these people whose deliberations
we are asked to imagine?" If the question is simply, "which people?",
the answer might seem to be the parties to the disagreement. This cer-
tainly includes those whose interests clash directly in the dispute, as well
as others who stand to be affected by the externalities of a settlement one
way or another. But there is also the question of how we should think
about the relationship between a particular dispute and those disputes
sufficiently like it to be influenced by its effect as a precedent. In many
cases, the contractarian mode of approaching a dispute will take this into
account: since the parties are required to contemplate the possibility that
they occupy the other's role, they are already thinking in terms suffi-
ciently abstract to guarantee the universalizability of the conclusions
they reach.27
A further question is whether the universalizability that contractarian-
ism provides is sufficient to capture the sense felt by many of us that in
some disputes the public or the community has an "interest" quite apart
from the individual interests of any of its particular members. For exam-
ple, most of us think that the rules about homicide should have a public
dimension that is not exhausted by even the fairest bargains that would
be struck between potential killers and potential victims. It matters to us
as a community under what conditions people's lives are taken away
from them; this reveals itself in the uneasiness we feel about consensual
homicides such as suicide pacts, euthanasia, blood sports (like boxing),
and the like. In these cases, we think a public debate is called for. But
how should we think about this debate? If the debate is couched in con-
26. See J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 8-9 (on "perfect compliance" theory).
27. Problems will only arise in those special cases in which the sheer number of particular cases
settled one way or the other is an independently relevant moral factor.
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tractarian terms, then the public serves the role of guarantor of the argu-
ment's integrity, rather than as an imagined party to the thought
experiment. Contractarianism, then, just is the form of the public
debate. However, the underlying contractarian idea is more seriously
threatened if we think of the public as a party with interests in the dis-
pute which are not captured either by considerations of externalities,
considerations of universalizability, or by general considerations of fair-
ness. To the extent that this view is adopted, the contractarian approach
would in effect be abandoned in favor of a more communitarian
approach to political morality.
There are other issues here too. Should people's sensitivities count as
externalities if their only interest in an issue is via an external or moralis-
tic preference? Should offense to a person's views about how moral deci-
sions ought to come out count equally with harms to persons themselves
as a basis for determining what an externality is? Our basic hunch is
that, since contractarianism is a way of settling moral disputes, it seems
sensible not to regard a person as a party if her only involvement is some
moral conviction (contractarian or not) about how it ought to be set-
tled.2" These sorts of convictions shortcircuit the very process of moral
reasoning that contractarianism attempts to provide.
Another important issue in determining who should be party to the
thought experiment involves geographical limitations. Are some issues
purely local? And should the constituency for even the widest questions
be limited by national boundaries in the way that contractarian argu-
ments usually are? The link between contractarianism and political self-
determination suggests an affirmative answer to this last question, while
its postulation as a method for resolving conflicts of interest generally
casts doubt upon the limitation. Those concerned with freedom and
legitimacy may take as their constituency those against whom the rule
will be enforced. Those concerned primarily with impartiality may be
interested in the somewhat wider community of all those whose interests
are affected in some way.
i. Motivation and Rationality
Once we have determined the constituency of the contractarian
approach, so to speak, further questions present themselves regarding
how we are to imagine these people conducting themselves, and how we
are to infer the conclusions that they might reach. All contractarianism
involves some distancing and some abstraction from people's actual
behavior, if only because it is a response to a situation in which actual
behavior has led to deadlocked conflict or to conflict likely to be resolved
28. There is a vast literature on external preferences. Recent contributions include Waldron,
Mill and the Value of Moral Distress, POL. STUD. (1987); Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORES
OF RIGHTS 153 (J. Waldron ed. 1984); C.L. TEN, MILL ON LIBERTY 10-41 (1980).
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by (what we regard as) undesirable means. But what sort of distancing
should we imagine?
The parties are to be imagined apart from the particular dispute in
which they are engaged. They are to be imagined contemplating the pos-
sibility of such a dispute and deliberating about it, but to be doing so in a
way that is not the same as plunging them immediately into it. We have
chosen that particular formulation in order to leave open as many ques-
tions as possible. Rawls is well known for the suggestion that people in
his "original position" will be bargaining behind a "veil of ignorance"
covering almost every particular aspect of their lives and situation.29
There may be a case for saying that nothing less than this can secure even
the minimum distance required for a contractarian approach to the vast
questions that Rawls is asking, and that a somewhat scantier veil would
be appropriate for a piecemeal approach. But at this stage we want to
leave open the question of whether the requisite distancing requires any
veil of ignorance at all.
In asking how the parties are to be imagined deliberating, we have to
raise complex and interwoven issues of motivation, reasoning, and
knowledge. So far as motivation is concerned, three broad alternatives
suggest themselves. The first is realistic: we might imagine that the par-
ties are ordinary people with their ordinary motivations (whatever they
happen to be). The second and third are more ideal-typic: perhaps the
parties are to be thought of in a strictly game-theoretic way, as individu-
als concerned with the satisfaction of their own desires and the advance-
ment of their own interests, which they know are not necessarily shared
by others; or perhaps the parties are to be thought of as ideal moral
beings, sensitive to the desires and interests of others in the ways the best
moral theory requires them to be.
It is easy to see why the third of these approaches, the one that sees
individuals as ideal moral beings, should be rejected. We adopt the con-
tractarian approach, if we do, in order to find out what is the right thing
to do about the disagreements with which we are concerned. It is not
much help to be told that to do this we should imagine what would be
decided by people who knew what was the right thing to do (though of
course trivially, this would yield the right answer!). Such an approach
confuses contractarians with the parties whose deliberations they are
imagining. It may be a good thing in actual political debate if disputants
behave like contractarians,3 ° but it will soon turn into a futile regress if
the people whose deliberations the contractarians are imagining are
themselves imagined to behave like contractarians.
The first approach to motivation-that the people who populate con-
29. J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 136-142.
30. That perhaps is what Rousseau required for the emergence of his general will.
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tractarian models simply are the ordinary everyday people we encounter
in daily life-is not as theoretically supine as it might appear. A consid-
erable literature has emerged in recent years suggesting as a sine qua non
for justice that we keep faith with the social meanings embedded in
people's senses of themselves and of their relations with one another.3"
This undoubtedly would make the contractarian method yield different
results for different societies, but perhaps that relativism is desirable.
Certainly, it need not lead to a conservative acceptance of whatever insti-
tutional arrangements happen to be in force in the society to which it
were applied. People's senses of themselves may be a product of the
social arrangements around them (and one who takes this approach must
be sensitive to that possibility), but they may often be at odds with these
arrangements. And, depending on what other constraints (on knowl-
edge, reasoning, etc.) we impose, we may still have the parties coming up
with conclusions that are surprising to those upon whom they are
modelled.32
This first approach has two variants. One indicates that we should
take people as they are in daily life and model our contracting parties on
the way people in the particular culture actually think and act. This
would yield moral results different from the arrangements currently in
force primarily when current arrangements were enforced or imposed by
one group against the wishes of others-a result that would have great
significance in evaluating systems of political oppression. The other vari-
ant of the realistic approach is to take actual people not as they currently
are, but as they aspire to be. This second method might yield social criti-
cism which calls for social and political arrangements different from the
ones currently in force even if the current arrangements were consensual
(though falling short of people's ultimate aspirations). In one sense, the
American constitutional convention accomplished this sort of thing by
creating a republic based on aspiration rather than on the then-existing
practice.33
Rawls adopted the second of our three approaches to moral motiva-
tion, stating that the theory of justice was a part-perhaps the most sig-
nificant part-of the theory of rational choice, and adopting a view that
the contracting parties should be seen as players in game-theoretically
constructed endeavors, motivated by their own self-interest 34 rather than
by any given sense of fellow-feeling or community.
31. See, e.g., A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981); M.
WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987); M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983) [hereinafter SPHERES OF JUSTICE].
32. See J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (1971) for development of the
ideal speech situation as a way of removing parochial interests from discourse.
33. But this sort of exercise often rules certain areas out of bounds in the reform, as the
constitutional convention did with slavery.
34. J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 142-150.
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But rational choice motivations need not be egoistic or self-centered.
People's own projects and desires may include altruistic concerns for
others: their families, neighbors, or famine victims in Ethiopia, for
example. Most individual altruism does not presuppose or amount to a
theory of justice or to a proposal for a solution to any of the problems a
contractarian might want to address; and, as long as it does not, there is
no paradox or circularity in attributing altruism to rational agents in a
model that is being used normatively to resolve conflicts of interest. The
point is simply that altruisms can clash as easily as (probably more easily
than) egoisms; and, as long as they do clash, there is still room for game
playing, bargaining, and agreement, understood in rational choice terms.
The only restrictive assumption of the rational choice approach (and it
may be artificial) is that once we have specified people's desires and
projects, altruistic or egoistic as they may be, each person is assumed to
take no further interest in the satisfaction or frustration of any of the
others' desires and projects. There may be reasons, however, for taking a
more restrictive approach than this. In Morals by Agreement, David
Gauthier maintains that sociability
becomes a source of exploitation if it induces persons to acquiesce in
institutions and practices that but for their fellow-feelings would be
costly to them. Feminist thought has surely made this, perhaps the
core form of human exploitation, clear to us. Thus the con-
tractarian insists that a society could not command the willing alle-
giance of a rational person if, without appealing to her feelings for
others, it afforded her no expectation of net benefit. a5
This is an independent theorem of justice which constrains the con-
tractarian model. Gauthier, understandably enough, does not attempt to
make a contractarian argument for the theorem.36
In Rawls's theory, the egoism of the imagined parties (if that is what it
is) is mitigated by their lack of knowledge; they know nothing of their
own desires except that they do possess some desires which are not neces-
sarily shared by others. There are two ways of looking at this specifica-
tion of ignorance. First, as we have already suggested, it may simply be
one way of achieving the abstraction necessary to get contractarian argu-
ments underway. Without some such assumption, the parties who are
imagined to be consenting find themselves just where they were when the
fight broke out. Secondly, such ignorance may be intended as an
independent moral constraint, though one designed to cover procedure
rather than outcome. On this reading, the lack of knowledge prevents
rational contracting parties from taking into account things which mor-
35. D. GAUTHIER, supra note 1, at 11.
36. Presumably a convincing argument would have to be double-pronged, showing the
convergence of restricted and non-restricted motivation on this theorem at a meta-level.
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ally ought to be excluded from consideration. We shall return to this
interpretation shortly.
Whether the contractarian chooses to adopt the moral motivations of
people as these motivations currently exist, or as they exist in people's
aspirations, or as they would exist if held by some abstracted set of
rational actors, depends on the purpose and uses of the contractarian
evaluation. If the point were to ask what an ideal society would look
like, then taking the moral motivation of idealized rational actors as the
basis may be sensible. This would make particular sense if one were
engaged in a holistic contractarian construction. If the point were to
achieve concrete political change in a particular context, however, then
one of the more grounded methods might be preferable. Piecemeal con-
tractarianism may fit more comfortably with considerations of the actual
or aspirational motivations of the particular members of a particular
social context if only because it would likely produce results more coher-
ent in the current structure. The important point for our purposes here
is to indicate that contractarianism as a method does not necessarily
.require some very abstract and stylized sense of who the contracting par-
ties are and what their motivations might be, as Rawls's conception sug-
gests. The approach may be used more modestly with more sociological
fidelity and still be fully contractarian.
ii Deliberation
The processes of reasoning attributed to the parties in a contractarian
framework must be familiar and intelligible to those whose actions are
ultimately to be guided or interests affected by the outcome of the con-
tractarian argument. Otherwise, persons to whom the arguments will be
addressed might see no match at all between their actual selves and the
way it is suggested they might have deliberated under the hypothetical
conditions. The reasoning must also be intelligible from a theoretical
point of view, for the model of deliberation is invoked in a process of
argument. This implies a degree of idealization, and again contractarians
have usually looked to the perfect, instrumental rationality of rational
choice theory as a model for the parties' reasoning. The parties are
understood to be rational maximizers, seeking to enhance their net satis-
factions under their knowledge, complete or incomplete, of the condition
to which that maximization is subject. It is assumed that they reason
consistently, that their preferences are coherent, that they can grasp
complex decision problems, and so on. Though these assumptions are
almost certainly idealized when compared to the processes of delibera-
tion that most people actually use, there is no great worry from a liberal
point of view about attributing them hypothetically to ordinary men and
women, provided it can be shown that the idealized conditions represent,
in a rigorous and articulate form, standards for reasoning that most peo-
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ple strive, however implicitly, to attain."
One obvious alternative-attempting to model exactly the actual
processes of deliberation of ordinary people-would be theoretically very
difficult. Conclusions would have to be inferred from evidence of some-
thing like small group experiments where analogous questions were
posed to people deliberately under something like the requisite condi-
tions. Some such experiments have been performed. For example,
experiments conducted by Norman Frolich, Joe Oppenheimer, and
Cheryl Eavey appear to show that real individuals, confronted with a
choice of regimes under circumstances that approximate Rawls's original
position, choose neither the maximin strategy of raising the floor as high
as possible nor the expected value strategy of maximizing the average.
Instead, groups of individuals overwhelmingly agree to maximize the
average with a floor constraint, a strategy that favors utilitarianism only
after the system provides contractarian guarantees against losing badly.
Real individuals, it seems, are willing to trade off some of their average
benefits in order to get a guarantee that they will not fall below a certain
level. But they are not so risk averse that they would sacrifice any possi-
bility of gain to be guaranteed the maximum possible floor. a8
But does this tell us how people would actually decide in a situation of
the sort that Rawls, for example, wants us to imagine? Certainly, there
would be ethical problems with any experimentation that dealt with seri-
ous questions of justice. The theory of justice deals with the conditions
under which people's lives are to be lived, life chances developed, and
long-term well-being facilitated or frustrated. It is simply not open to a
social science experimenter (unless she is a Mengele) to offer issues of this
kind to real people under circumstances in which the issues will be taken
seriously. There are obvious difficulties in extrapolating from a labora-
tory experiment where the participants know they will be paid and can
return to their comfortable homes at night, to conclusions about how
people would determine the fundamental basis of the distribution of
wealth for the society in which they are to live. 9 Still, other indirect
empirical evidence may be available.
But whether the empirical evidence is direct or indirect, it would be
difficult to use it as a complete substitute for an intelligible model of rea-
soning in the original position, though it may provide helpful informa-
tion about how such reasoning might proceed within a more general
model. Without some such general model, we would have no basis for
extrapolating material for our agreement except a purely inductive one:
37. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Waldron, supra note 10, at 127-150.
38. Frolich, Oppenheimer & Eavey, Laboratory Results on Rawls's Distributive Justice, 17 BRIT.
J. POL. SCI. 1 (1987); Frolich, Oppenheimer & Eavey, Choice of Principles of Distributive Justice in
Experimental Groups, 31 AM. J. POL. Sci. 606 (1987).
39. Clearly, these difficulties are most acute for holistic contractarianism-perhaps less of a
problem for some piecemeal approaches.
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this is how decision-makers have been observed to behave in the past.
That may appear inadequate if the aim of the contractarian approach is
to represent decision-making as a process of deliberation that is sensible
to imagine as one's own and not just as a black box with input and out-
put. We should remember, however, that although the most commonly
used model to fill in this knowledge is a rational choice one, there is
nothing in the contractarian logic which excludes other intelligible and
coherent models of reasoning.
iL Knowledge and the Conditions of Justice
What about various special constraints on the parties' knowledge and
considerations in the original position? What about risk aversion, igno-
rance, neutrality, and the like? It has often been observed that con-
tractarianism is an utterly Protean approach: any slight variation in the
way in which deliberation is conceived to be conducted will yield sub-
stantial differences in the outputs obtained.' For example, Rawls is
widely supposed to have assumed that the parties in his original position
were risk-averse; vary that assumption, it is said, and his case against
utilitarianism is significantly less substantial.4" There are two things to
be said about this alleged malleability.
First, whether one should incorporate assumptions about risk aver-
sion, future discounting, etc., will depend partly on one's empirical sense
of the persons whom one is modelling. In some societies, the people to be
modelled may be very conservative; in others, they may be reckless; in
others, there may be some mix of the two. In addition, there is the ques-
tion, briefly discussed above, of how to make a model both intelligible
and realistic. The golden rule for a contractarian is that the further her
model is from people's own sense of who they are and how they feel they
ought actually to make their decisions (not, be it noted, how they do
actually make their decisions), the less appealing the contractarian argu-
ment as a whole will be to them in their political thinking. There is a
trade-off then, as we have seen, between theoretical elegance and political
conviction. Different people will make the trade-off differently, and the
conclusion to draw from this is that one argument is more or less elegant,
40. For example, B. ACKERMAN writes in SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 237 (1980),
"It is just too easy to manipulate the definitions of chooser and choice set to generate a conclusion
that suits one's fancy."
41. See, e.g., R.M. Hare, Rawls's Theory of Justice, in READING RAWLS (N. Daniels ed. 1975).
But this is a misreading of Rawls. As a matter of fact, there is no assumption in his argument that
the parties are risk-averse. The argument against average utilitarianism centers around the idea that
the risks it would involve are risks the parties may not take (for reasons connected with the strains
of commitment), as opposed to risks they would not take. Insofar as there is an argument about risk
aversion at all, it is to the effect that a rational strategy for a one-off bet on which all one's life
prospects are riding is by no means easily discernible. See J. RAwLS, supra note 1, at 170-171;
Waldron, John Rawls and the Social Minimum, 3 J. APPL. PHIL. 25 (1986).
1991]
23
Scheppele and Waldron: Contractarian Methods in Political and Legal Evaluation
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1991
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
or more or less appealing, than another-not that the whole approach is
discredited by the differences.
And, here again, the point of contractarian evaluation should make a
difference to our worries about the flexibility of the method. If the point
of contractarian evaluation is to use the results as resources in political or
legal debate, then the model will be more convincing the more it matches
the circumstances in which the debate actually takes place. But, if the
point is to determine ideal practices or to determine the abstract basis for
reflective judgments about justice, then the conclusions will be more sen-
sitive to small tinkerings with the assumptions and less compelling across
different visions of political life. It does not follow that the conclusions
are always meaningless or that they have no bearing on political debate.
If there are good arguments in favor of adopting one set of assumptions
over another, then the sensitivity of the conclusions to those assumptions
is a matter on which the contractarian should pride herself. It shows the
importance of having good arguments for the starting point of con-
tractarian reasoning.
Second, those who criticize contractarianism for its adaptability, criti-
cize it as though it pretended to be a single theory. But no such pretense
is made except by those who want to use the label critically. Contractari-
anism is a type of approach and there are many different strategies of this
type. These strategies have, as we saw earlier, a certain spirit in common
and a certain framework. Those who think that bottom-line conclusions
are all that matter in political philosophy and who are uninterested in the
way such conclusions were reached will no doubt find these similarities
irrelevant. Those who think otherwise may be more interested.
That conclusions are sensitive to assumptions tells us that we should
pay some critical attention to the assumptions of contractarian models.
One set of considerations, referred to by Rawls and others as "the cir-
cumstances of justice," may be sensible to take into account and model in
the original position, if possible. These are the conditions of human life
that define and sharpen the problems addressed by normative theory.
They concern the sort of beings we are and the sort of environment we
live in. They include not only the old standards of scarcity, mutual vul-
nerability, and limited altruism, but also the facts that each society has a
history, that its inhabitants adhere to different ideals, that time and
patience are not infinite, that there are limits to what people can bear,
and so on. There is no point insisting that only a priori truths be
included under this heading; these are empirical facts of human life,
which may vary (and of which our knowledge and understanding may
vary) from time to time and place to place.42 We see no merit in the
42. For the circumstances of justice, see J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 126-130; H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 189-195 (1961); D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 484-501 (A.
S. Bigge ed. 1888).
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suggestion made popular by writers like Macpherson and Sandel that the
contingency (and perhaps the unpleasantness) of these truths derogates
from the interest of the theories that take them into account.43 Nor-if
we are convinced that they are true, and likely to remain true, for any
society we may concoct-is there any point in relegating them (as Acker-
man, for example, relegates mutual vulnerability and the strains of com-
mitment)" to the realm of second best theory, and constructing a
contractarian "core," so to speak, predicated on the hypothesis that they
can be overcome. If the contractarian approach is to address real human
problems, then the circumstances which define those problems must be
modelled in the core. Again, the general point is that the less abstraction
from the circumstances of political and social life, the more convincing
the contractarian models will be. Assumptions that represent deviations
from the world as we find it demand special justification in contractarian
models.
One such assumption is the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance," which has
attracted considerable critical attention. Rawls stipulated that the par-
ties in his imagined "original position" were to deliberate as though they
were ignorant of their abilities and preferences (they merely knew that
they had some abilities and preferences) and of the particular features of
their society.45 From a strictly rational choice point of view, these
restrictions must be modelled as a sort of amnesia, to avoid the patent
irrationality of decision-makers failing to take into account some of the
beliefs which they have.
Now this is obviously a significant abstraction from everyday political
life, but there may be a good reason for it. Perhaps this restriction on
knowledge captures our sense of the reasons that are relevant and irrele-
vant in moral argument: a view about relevant reasons may be repre-
sented for the purposes of moral theory as a constraint on deliberation.46
The irrelevance of information about one's own role in a dispute may, as
we have seen, be bound up with the distancing that the contractarian
approach to dispute resolution necessarily involves. Or it may be bound
up with one's sense of the problem being addressed: it is difficult to see
why information about society's present structure should be considered
relevant to a discussion of the structure that a society-any society, in
Rawls's original formulation-ought to have. Of course, one will want to
include whatever general information we have, including information
43. See C.B. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 19 (1973); M.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 33 (1982).
44. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 40, at 21-24.
45. J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 136-142. This restriction is often read to imply that all persons in
the original position are the same. But this is not so: they know that others do not necessarily share
their ideals.
46. This is roughly the way in which Ackerman treats the requirement of neutrality, which we
will consider in a moment. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 40, at 8-11.
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induced from our particular situation: if we have discovered, for exam-
ple, that Keynesian intervention in an economy is self-defeating, that will
no doubt be relevant. But the exclusion of strictly particular informa-
tion-that we live within this system rather than some other-is a help-
ful way of getting us to focus on the radical nature of the question being
posed. If the question posed is less holistic, however, the case for exclud-
ing particular information diminishes. If the question is of the piecemeal
type and, for example, asks what would be a just abortion law for us,
then information about the other background institutions we have (per-
missibility of contraception, availability of contraception and child care,
history of gender oppression, and so on) is obviously relevant.
Eventually, though, the justification of restrictions on information or
constraints on deliberation is a moral one. Even if such restrictions are
simply ways of getting us to see the problem that is being posed, they are
eo ipso ways of asking us to think morally and to cast our imaginations
beyond a preoccupation with our own peculiar concerns. This indicates
that the principles in question are likely to be quite deep and to lie near
the root of the very impulse to do liberal political philosophy. To con-
sider the interests and situations of others on a par with one's own, to
refuse to accept as a justification of a regime the mere fact that one does
very well under that regime while others suffer-these are principled atti-
tudes. But they are not, so to speak, principles which are optional or
dispensable in our tradition of political philosophy. They are intimately
bound up with the attitudes that define that whole enterprise. Thus,
although there may be controversy about whether a Rawlsian "veil of
ignorance" gives best expression to this idea, there can be little dispute
that some such idea must be represented somehow in a contractarian
theory.
In Social Justice and the Liberal State, Bruce Ackerman imposes a
further constraint: that the deliberating parties may not advance reasons
which require them to assert that any one conception of the good is supe-
rior to any other.47 This may be justified in similar ways. If a clash of
ideals is the dispute the contractarian is addressing, then neutrality is
bound up with the distancing that the approach necessarily involves. But
if, in the end, it comes down to the morality of relevant reasons, neutral-
ity may be more difficult to sustain as a matter of principle. It is cer-
tainly the case that liberal political philosophy requires one to be
sensitive not only to the existence of a plurality of conceptions of the
good, but also to conceptions that are rejected by the most populous or
powerful group. But it is difficult to infer from this requirement a further
47. Id. at 8-11. Ackerman denies that his theory is contractarian. Id. at 6, 336 et seq. But his
thought-experiment about colonists on a spaceship engaging in constrained dialogue to determine
the distribution of advantages in a new world is sufficiently close to the spirit of the approach we
outlined at the beginning to be worth considering here.
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requirement not to use one's conception in constrained deliberation; such
an absolute requirement would raise the question of whether there is a
point to having a deeply held view about the good life at all, if it is not to
be deployed on occasions like this.4"
C. Unanimity
The nature of the contractarian exercise imposes certain constraints on
decision-making. The parties are to look for a solution, since the
problems addressed by this approach are practical and urgent. And the
solution is to be unanimous, for one cannot be voted into a contract. If
we are imagining an agreement by which a person will be bound or an
agreement which makes it permissible to do certain things to that person,
then it must be thought of as an agreement that commands that person's
own consent, otherwise the link between individual consent on the one
hand and obligation or legitimacy on the other hand is broken.
There are two points which are important about this requirement of
unanimous agreement. First, there may be good arguments for leaving
certain issues to be resolved by majority vote (either by the imagined
contracting parties or by us in real life); but, if so, they must be argu-
ments which can themselves be presented as securing unanimous support
in the original position for that particular case. In other words, there
must be unanimous agreement that a majority vote should settle an issue
for a majority vote to count as legitimate in a contractarian framework.
This will work more persuasively for some issues than for others.4 9 Sec-
ondly, the contractarian is committed by her assumptions to drawing
quite drastic conclusions from irreconcilable disagreements. If there is
no solution which can secure unanimous acceptance on some issue, then
there is no solution that can legitimately be enforced across the board.
This may mean that there are some political problems for which there
may be no morally acceptable answers in a particular population and
that the only strategy to adopt consistent with contractarian evaluation is
some form of pluralism or some form of federalism or secession.
We saw earlier that rational choice models may problematically under-
represent the concern for others' interests required by a liberal theory.
The unanimity criterion bound up with the contractarian idea itself-the
fact that one cannot be voted into a social contract-overcomes this diffi-
culty. As we saw earlier, the idea of the social contract addresses indi-
vidualized problems of obligation and legitimacy: what reason can be
given to this person for why she should obey or for why force used
against her is legitimate? Now, a rich and powerful person's satisfaction
with the regime under which she benefits may be sufficient to generate
48. For further discussion, see R. DWORKIN, Liberalism, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191-204
(1985) and J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
49. See J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 195-201.
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her own consent to it, but it cannot explain why others, who are less
advantaged, should give their approval and submit to the same frame-
work of rules. Preoccupation with one's own interests, therefore, is
unlikely to be a way of legitimating a regime in which one proposes to
benefit from the submission and deprivation of others.
Thus, suppose we consider Rawls's question of whether a regime
organized around principles of average utility could command the con-
sent of those who were to be subject to it in circumstances where there
was reason to believe that a minority might have to be exploited for the
greater average happiness. A veil of ignorance of the type Rawls pro-
posed perhaps ensures that nobody would agree to such a regime for fear
that she might turn out to be among the oppressed minority. So the
regime is illegitimate. However, remove the veil of ignorance and the
same conclusion-illegitimacy--can be obtained. Those who knew the
circumstances that put them among the fortunate majority might be will-
ing to consent to the regime, but those who had reason to fear that they
would be in a minority would not. Since it is the essence of the con-
tractarian approach that a regime is legitimated only by the consent of
everyone subject to it-that is, everyone with respect to whom its rules
are to apply and be enforced-the consent of the majority will not do.
The regime we are imagining will not work if a minority is exploited, so if
consent of the minority is not obtained in such a regime, the regime can-
not be legitimated. Strictly speaking, then, the Rawlsian veil of igno-
rance is redundant: the very idea of a contractarian theory already
models in its unanimity the reciprocal concern for others' interests that
liberal political theory presupposes.
D. Positive and Negative Contractarianism
The final question about the internal mechanics of contractarian argu-
ments concerns the conclusions the contracting parties are to be
imagined reaching. We have already seen that the contracting parties
may be imagined to be addressing questions of a wider or a narrower
compass. But their answers may also vary in another way. They may be
imagined to agree on a particular positive solution to a problem posed to
them. Or they may only get as far as agreeing to rule certain possible
solutions out. We shall call these alternatives positive and negative con-
tractarianism respectively.
In positive contractarianism, some actual or proposed social rule is
justified by reference to claims about what would have been agreed to in
an "original position." The contract model lends it positive support. In
negative contractarianism, the model is used primarily in a negative or
critical way. It is used to show that a certain actual or proposed rule
would not have been consented to in an "original position," thereby rul-
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ing out certain things without necessarily ruling anything in.50
This distinction between positive and negative contractarianism cuts
across the distinction between holistic and piecemeal contractarianism,
and it is separable too from the issue of the completeness of the social
conception that emerges from a contractarian argument. Rawls, in our
classification, counts as a positive contractarian even though a complete
social blueprint does not emerge from A Theory of Justice and even
though his work leaves many issues quite unresolved (including, as we
said earlier, the issue of property). 5' The fact is that Rawls poses a very
abstract question-what are to be the basic principles of social evalua-
tion?-and purports to give a complete and positive answer to that ques-
tion. Any further questions are simply questions of which institutional
arrangements in fact satisfy his principles given the circumstances of the
society involved. 2 Thus, for example, Rawls concludes from his discus-
sion that all social and economic inequalities are to be adjusted so that
they work to the benefit of the least advantaged group; whereas a nega-
tive contractarian might be content to say that the least advantaged must
never be allowed to sink below a certain level, leaving it open how and on
what terms inequalities above that level were to be evaluated.53
As befits its modesty, negative contractarianism has a number of
advantages. We saw earlier that a hypothetical contract can establish
nothing about the obligations that people actually have but can only
establish at most that a regime is legitimate. 4 A hypothetical contract
can, however, be used to establish that people do not and cannot have an
obligation of a certain sort. For if it is the case that no one would (or,
better still, could) agree to a certain arrangement, then that arrangement
is shown to be in principle incapable of commanding the sort of actual
consent that might oblige somebody to submit to it in fact. The point
can be put another way. Establishing in a hypothetical argument that an
arrangement would or would not be agreed to is a way of establishing
terms in which the reality of what purports, in actual life, to be consent
to that arrangement can be impugned. To do so is not to insult the per-
son whose consent is being impugned, for the question will usually only
arise in circumstances where she wants to repudiate the alleged obliga-
tion anyway. Negative hypothetical contractarianism is therefore a very
50. Actually, the distinction is just a little more complicated than this, for the conclusions of a
negative contractarian argument may be represented in an actual rule (for example, a constitutional
rule about lower order rules that are not to be made, or political acts that are not to be undertaken).
A better way to put the matter would be that positive contractarians use their method to solve social
problems; negative contractarians use it only to constrain their solutions.
51. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
52. His conception is supposed to do all the evaluative work that utilitarianism has been used to
do by others.
53. See Waldron, supra note 41.
54. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
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powerful tool of political criticism."
Hypothetical consent, then, can take either the positive form of show-
ing how regimes with particular content may be legitimated or the nega-
tive form of showing how particular obligations could not possibly arise.
Either way, hypothetical consent can play a major role in political
evaluation.
III. THE USES OF CONTRACTARIANISM
It is not our intention in this paper to consider what specific conclu-
sions might be reached by parties who are imagined to be deliberating on
some issue in any of the original positions we have discussed. But the
contractarian method will be used to generate some propositions about
the right or the best or the just way to run a society or some aspect of it.
In this final section we want to say something about the ways in which
these conclusions should be used.
The contractarian method is likely to be used against the background
of some political dispute-some discussion in a community about what
should be done. It will not be the only method of argument being
deployed in that discussion, but it is always tempting for the con-
tractarian to use her method in a rather authoritarian way--coming
down from the mountain, Moses-like, with the results of her thought
experiment and announcing to the assembled masses that there is no
need for any further argument. Since the assembled masses are likely to
resent this attitude, it may be worth considering some of the ways in
which they might find it offensive. Two sources of resentment are partic-
ularly important. People may claim that the abstraction of the con-
tractarian's thought experiment fails to capture the local sense of "the
way things are done around here." And they may complain that the
contractarian's announcement wrongly preempts their discussion-as
though hypothetical deliberations in an imaginary forum could somehow
be a substitute for democratic decision making in a real one. We will
take each of these worries in turn.
A. Local Morality and Contractarian Solutions
Contractarian moral theory may appear to substitute abstract univer-
sal judgments for local ones, and those who believe that asking what is
right in general misses the essentially local nature of answers to that
question may be skeptical of this method. Rawls's theory has been criti-
cized for winding up, after all of its abstraction and argument, with a
structure of institutions that looks very much like the contemporary
55. It was, in fact, the main form of the contractarian method used by John Locke. See, e.g., J.
LOCKE, supra note 13, at 398-409. See generally R. TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 143-155 (1979).
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United States, and this has been thought to pose special dangers for the
application of the method elsewhere.56 Some moral relativists may see
contractarian theory as threatening moral imperialism in cultures where
American values do not apply. And they worry about the nonrelativist
character of contractarianism as a result."'
The opposition between relativist and nonrelativist moral theories has
often been misunderstood. Nonrelativist moral theories do not necessar-
ily maintain that all societies in all times and places are governed by the
same substantive moral rules. It would be possible for a nonrelativist to
argue in favor of the general rule: "when in X, do as the X-ians do,"
generalizing from the case of Rome. This can be adopted as a general
moral framework, but there need be nothing universal in its implication
across societies. The theory is an indexical one, not a relativist one,
because it asserts that this rule for determining permissible content
should be followed no matter what the setting. Some nonrelativist moral
theories, then, may leave room for quite a lot of the local morality with-
out losing their generality or universalizability. Contractarianism is one
such theory. How much local content appears in the outcome depends
crucially on how the model is specified. But, as we have seen, there are
several ways in which the model can be left open to local input.
One way to make room for local content is to adopt the negative rather
than the positive variety of the theory. While it is true that a con-
tractarian theory of a detailed and positive kind may propose a blueprint
for the organization of a society-one which might have the potential to
(but would not necessarily) overwhelm local understandings-negative
contractarianism merely sets the outer boundaries of political debate and
leaves a great deal of room for local decision-making within those limits.
Unless there were tremendous hostility to individual consent as a legiti-
mating force, the negative contractarian view would not necessarily
undermine local understandings. But it would be precisely in situations
where the local understandings excluded such empowerment of the indi-
vidual that the contractarian would want to say more than that each
culture should operate on its own terms. Negative contractarianism does
not pose much of a constraint on the organization of social and political
life, but it does impose some, and the point where that bit of constraint
kicks in is precisely where liberals have actually wanted to draw nonrela-
tivist conclusions about the organization of different societies.
Another way to allow for local understandings is to adjust the image
one has of the contracting parties, the amount of knowledge they have,
and the way in which they reason. If the parties are to be modelled after
those we find in abstract game-theoretic encounters, the contractarian
56. See, e.g., Nielson, Justice and Class in JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION (1978).
57. See generally M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 31, Chs. 1, 2, 13.
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thought experiment will incorporate less local understanding than if the
parties are conceived of as more like the real people found in a particular
social setting. Similarly, if the parties are imagined not to know things
that most people in a particular political culture do know or are thought
to reason in a way that is unusual or undesirable in the local setting, the
model will have less local connection and probably less political appeal.
In this article, we have tried to show that there is a series of choices to be
made on these questions. Contractarianism as a general approach can
include a variety of portrayals of people, the knowledge they have, and
the sort of reasoning that they use-portrayals which may be closer to or
more distant from the local norms. Just how the parties are to be
imagined depends on the purposes of the theorist and the uses to which
the conclusions will be put.
Any contractarian theory will also presuppose a view of how one inter-
prets the facts of situations to which contractarian solutions would be
relevant. Perception itself is not universal; some cultures see as central
features of situations thought to be peripheral or irrelevant by others.
Moreover, perceptions may vary within a culture in systematic ways.
The perceptual frame the contractarian chooses (whether, for example,
she chooses the perceptual frame of those who are disadvantaged or of
those who represent a long-standing set of traditions) will influence the
degree of local content in the thought experiment as well. 8
All of these are choices about how the thought experiment is done.
But we should also consider what happens with the results after the
thought experiment is completed. Contractarian results can be used as a
resource in political debate-one among many such resources that may
be present in a particular context. Its use may be trumped by considera-
tions of tradition or utility, by exercises of power or by a majority vote of
current participants with their unretouched preferences. The existence
of a contractarian argument does not guarantee its success. Those who
would live under such a set of institutions or rules or policies need to be
convinced that their actual consent should follow their hypothetical con-
sent. And, in particular local contexts, other factors may sway actual
consent.
Contractarianism does not lead to single right answers that are true for
all times and places. It may have more or less local variation, depending
on the specification of the model and the uses to which it is put. As a
moral stance, contractarianism is in its general structure tolerant of a
wide variety of internal variations. Contractarians with different choices
for the questions outlined in Part II of this article may well produce dif-
ferent answers to moral problems.
58. For an exploration of this problem of point of view, see Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape
Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1095 (1987); Scheppele, Telling Stories, 87 U. MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989).
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In his more recent writings, John Rawls has offered a much more rela-
tivist interpretation than we have, not only of the particular choices a
contractarian may make, but of the contractarian enterprise itself:
We are not trying to find a conception of justice suitable for all soci-
eties regardless of their particular social or historical circumstances.
We want to settle a fundamental disagreement over the just form of
basic institutions within a democratic society under modem condi-
tions. We look to ourselves and to our future, and reflect upon our
disputes since, let's say, the Declaration of Independence. How far
the conclusions we reach are of interest in a wider context is a sepa-
rate question. 59
If this is accepted, it is a mistake to apply the spirit of the con-
tractarian enterprise to societies that do not share our history or our con-
cerns, even given the ample room that the approach leaves for local
variation and local understandings. We have our doubts about whether
contractarians should be so modest, though we cannot fully consider the
issue here. Two points should be made, however. First, it may not be in
fact open to us to restrict the range of our moral thinking in this way.
Societies are no longer hermetically sealed off from one another in either
their thought or the impact of their social arrangements. And the mod-
em democratic societies that Rawls wants to concentrate on are nowa-
days in effect microcosms of world society: they include hundreds of
cultures and subcultures, representing more or less all the social forms
that there are, and the task of finding common principles for them all
cannot be avoided.6' Secondly, this relativism does less than justice to
the nature of our own moral thinking. We cannot have the thoughts we
do in our culture about the relation between, say, autonomy, obligation,
and coercion while restricting their application to one particular society.
To the extent, for example, that those thoughts are grounded in Kantian
concerns, their application is necessarily universal. To say, therefore,
that the contractarianism which embodies these thoughts is to apply only
to our local arrangements and may have no application to what we think
beyond them, is to distort our meanings and misrepresent our moral
thoughts.61
B. Contractarianism and Democracy
Contractarianism models a form of decision-making. It asks us to
imagine both a particular sort of context in which decisions are made and
59. Kantian Constructivism, supra note 3, at 518. See also Justice as Fairness, supra note 3, at
224-225.
60. This is particularly true of America and increasingly of Britain.
61. See J. WALDRON, NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX ON THE
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a particular set of procedures for making those decisions. The idea is
that everyone participates, everyone's interests are consulted, and every-
one strives to get a sense of what it is like to be each of the others. No
elite imposes an ideal solution: the right is what emerges from a discus-
sion among equals. Because of the way these things are specified, democ-
racy emerges as a privileged form of governance on the contractarian
account. The conditions for contractarian decision-making and the con-
ditions for democracy are so close as to make their convergence seem
deliberate. Contractarianism may reproduce what an ideal democracy
operating in ideal circumstances would do.
But not all forms of democracy will satisfy these conditions of con-
tractarianism. The contingencies of democratic politics leave issues of
principle at the mercy of the play of political forces; and in its majoritari-
anism, democracy seems at odds with the contractarian idea that the
consent of each person is needed before she can be said to have assumed
an obligation or before power can legitimately be exercised over her.
Clearly, a democracy that resolved issues by majority vote (or worse still,
by a majority vote among representatives) would be less like a con-
tractarian original position than one that resolved issues after a discus-
sion of various arguments ending in unanimous agreement. Majority
votes allow minorities to go unsatisfied in a way that would block con-
tractarian solutions. Discussion and unanimous agreement are less typi-
cal of actual democracies, but more like some democratic ideal. Indeed,
the model of democracy that best fits contractarianism may well be more
like the Tanzanian theory of a one-party state (based on consensus rather
than factions) than the Madisonian theory of head-counting.62 The point
here is that democracy can be seen sometimes as a trial of strength where
the outcomes depend on which faction has the most adherents and some-
times as a process of deliberation where the outcomes depend on which
view is most convincing. Only conceptions of the latter kind answer to
contractarian concerns.
Still, even on the most attractive model of democracy, there is tension
between contractarianism as a mode of thought and democracy as an
actual practice. The last question we want to raise is how much room is
left for actual democratic decision making once the contractarian has
delivered her conclusions? Once again, this depends on the sort of con-
tractarian analysis one is using. A positive contractarian may leave very
little to be resolved through democratic processes; after all, if the right
answer can be found in reasoning through hypothetical cases, there is not
much for actual decision-makers to do. This posed an embarrassing
problem for Rawls-never resolved in his theory. One of the positive
62. For the contrast, see the discussion in Nursey-Bray, Consensus and Community: The
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conclusions of his contractarian theory was that people should have the
greatest rights of political participation consistent with an equal right for
all. This principle was among those ranked lexically prior to the Differ-
ence Principle which was to govern and constrain social and economic
inequality. So, if people actually vote to use principles other than the
Difference Principle to deal with social and economic inequality, surely
that vote should prevail over the Difference Principle (which was also
reached by contractarian reasoning). But, then, what is the point of con-
tractarian reasoning once political rights, and their priority, have been
established? Rawls's answer was to express a hope that political proce-
dures could be adjusted so that outcomes consonant with the Difference
Principle would be more likely.63 But this seems to lose faith with the
priority of the principle of equal liberty also, particularly if these adjust-
ments take the form of constraints on participation.
It seems to us that there are two connected ways in which a con-
tractarian may avoid such difficulties. She cannot avoid them by denying
rights of political participation: such rights, as we have seen, are so con-
gruent with the contractarian approach, that it is incredible to suppose
they would not emerge as conclusions. But clearly a move from positive
to negative contractarianism makes things easier. Negative contractari-
anism allows any solution as long as it fits within certain boundaries; it
finds only what may not be done and is indifferent among solutions
which have been ruled in, thereby providing an obviously greater oppor-
tunity for democratic decision-making." Its aim would be to mirror, in
other words, democratic citizens' own sense of the alternatives available
that are clearly unacceptable.
But the second and connected point goes more deeply. It may well be
that one of the uses of contractarian argument is not to preempt the exer-
cise of democracy, but rather to give people an account of how their
democratic decision process might go. Contractarian accounts may be
used as resources in actual political debate, attempting to get real citizens
in a democratic society to adopt the attitudes of contracting parties, to
learn to think impartially about the conflicts which confront them, to
find solutions to political deadlocks that do not just represent the balance
of competing interest groups. Contractarianism asks us to take a special
attitude toward democratic decision-making-to see it not as an opportu-
nity for voting our interests and trying to get ahead, but rather as a way
of respecting the plans and hopes of others while respecting our own and
of realizing that others have legitimate claims to make even if their inter-
63. J. RAwLs, supra note 1, at 195-201, 221-234.
64. One might argue that constitutionalism can be a form of contractarianism on this account,
since constitutions specify the moral boundaries within which democratic processes may operate. If
the specific constitutional constraints are those for which plausible contractarian arguments can be
given, then a constitutional democracy may embody a negative contractarian approach.
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ests are different from ours. It asks us to be compassionate and under-
standing, not petty and narrow-minded. It establishes impartiality as a
way of respecting other persons. If we are asking why people should take
any notice of a contractarian, something like this may ultimately provide
our answer.
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